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SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DIMITRIOS DESLIS, 
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APPELLANT'S OPENING 
BRIEF 
Case No. 980269-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of 
Demitrios Deslis ("Appellant") for Obstruction of Justice, a Class 
B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance § 
11.04.060. See Addendum I. This Court obtains jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal of a criminal case involving a Class B Misdemeanor, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient evidence presented to convict 
Appellant of Obstruction of Justice? 
2. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to raise 
the issue that the trial court did not make an adequate finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to a specific 
subsection of the ordinance? 
3. Did the trial court commit plain error in not making 
specific findings as to which section of the ordinance Appellant 
was found to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? 
JL Standard of Appellate Review 
1. "To successfully challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence, appellant must demonstrate that the clear weight of [the] 
evidence contradicts the trial court's verdict." State v. McBride, 
940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
2» The ineffectiveness of counsel claim presents a 
mixed question of law and fact, such that the trial court's factual 
2 
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findings deserve some deference on appeal. However, the legal 
conclusions of the trial court are reviewed de novo, for correction 
of error.1 
3. The plain error analysis requires a review of the 
trial record as a whole to determine if the claimed errors were 
obvious and seriously affected the fairness of the trial. See 
State v. Eldredge, 173 P.2d 29, 35 & nn. 7-12 (Utah), cert, denied, 
493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 
724, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
The following ordinance provides the determinative law on 
appeal and is reproduced verbatim at Addendum II: Salt Lake City 
Ordinance § 11.04.060; Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-202 (1953, as 
1
 See State v. Classon, P.2d , , 312 Utah Adv. Rep. 
26, 30-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 
1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). See also State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 
584, 591 (Utah Ct. App.) (ineffective presented without prior 
evidentiary hearing is question of law), cert, granted, 910 P.2d 
425 (Utah 1995). 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
amended); the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
and Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A* Nature of the Case 
An Information filed against Appellant on or about March 
18, 1998, charged him with Obstruction of Justice, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060. 
(R. 4) . 
B~ Course of Proceedings 
Appellant proceeded to trial, without a jury, before the 
Honorable Lee Dever, on April 23, 1998 (R. 30). Salt Lake City 
Police Officers, Bryan Bailey ("Bailey") and Mike Hatch ("Hatch") 
testified on behalf of the City. Tony Ouzounian also testified on 
behalf of the City. (Tr. 4, 19, 32). Appellant testified in his 
own behalf. (Tr. 35) . 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
4 
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Appellant was found guilty of Obstruction of Justice by 
the Honorable Lee Dever, on April 23, 1998. (R. 36). He was 
sentenced that same day to six months in jail, which was suspended, 
and a $1,000 fine, of which $800.00 was suspended (R. 36). 
D. Statement of the Facts 
Bailey testified at trial that he was on duty February 8, 
1998, and involved in unrelated arrests at a bar called Papiyons, 
located at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Tr. 5). While he was outside 
the bar making these arrests, he saw Appellant get into the 
passenger's side of a black Porche. (Tr. 5). Bailey observed the 
Porche head eastbound on Pierpont Avenue and hit another vehicle 
(Tr. 5). This occurred at approximately 1:00 a.m. (Tr. 9). Another 
officer, Hatch, was also assisting Bailey, and attempted to 
approach the accident scene on foot (Tr. 6). Before Hatch was able 
to approach the vehicle, it sped off (Tr. 6) . 
Bailey had recognized Appellant from prior contacts, and 
knew that Appellant lived at American Towers. (Tr. 12) . Both 
officers later went to American Towers and were escorted into the 
hallway of Appellant's residence by the security guards (Tr. 7). 
5 
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The officers arrived at Appellant's residence around 2:54 a.m. (Tr. 
11). Bailey knocked on the door to Appellant's residence and 
identified himself. (Tr. 8). Bailey explained to Appellant why he 
was there and that he needed to know who was driving the Porche and 
where it was located. (Tr. 8) . Appellant indicated that he couldn't 
tell the officer who was driving because the driver was a friend. 
(Tr. 8). Appellant was then placed under arrest. (Tr. 8). Bailey 
testified that Appellant did not request to speak with an attorney 
or show him any card which reflected such information. (Tr. 16, 
17) . Prior to transporting Appellant to the police station, the 
officers searched his residence to see if anyone was hiding there. 
The officers found no one else in the residence. (Tr. 18, 19). 
Hatch then testified that he was also on duty outside the 
Papiyons bar on February 8, 1998. (Tr. 20) . Hatch testified that he 
observed Appellant get into the passenger's side of a black Porche 
(Tr. 20) . He later heard a crash and observed the Porche about 40-
50 feet up the street, which looked as if it had crashed into a 
parked van. (Tr. 20). The Porche left the scene as Hatch tried to 
approach it. (Tr. 21). 
6 
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Hatch testified that he and Bailey later went to American 
Towers where Appellant lived. They searched for the Porche there, 
and located it in the parking lot. (Tr. 22). The vehicle appeared 
to have been involved in an accident because it was leaking 
transmission fluid. (Tr. 22) . The officers also called for an 
impound vehicle prior to speaking with Appellant. (Tr. 25). The 
Porche had a dealer license plate on it (Tr. 30) . The officer then 
contacted Appellant at his apartment. When Appellant was asked 
about the accident, he responded that he wasn't going to talk to 
them. (Tr. 23) . Hatch also testified that he never heard Appellant 
request a "lawyer" or an "attorney." (Tr. 27). Hatch also stated 
that no one else was found in the apartment (Tr. 28). 
Tony Ouzounian testified for the City that he owned a 
black Porche, which was involved in a hit-and-run accident on 
February 8, 1998 (Tr. 32-33) . Mr. Ouzounian further testified that 
Appellant was a passenger in his vehicle at that time (Tr. 33). 
Appellant's trial attorney moved to dismiss the case at 
the close of the City's case for insufficiency of evidence, which 
motion was denied. (Tr. 34). 
7 
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Appellant then testified in his own behalf and indicated 
that when the police arrived at his apartment, he informed them 
that he could not answer any questions without his attorney 
present. (Tr* 37). 
The trial court then found Appellant "guilty of the crime 
charged" based upon the evidence presented (Tr. 40). The trial 
court further stated that the Fifth Amendment was not an issue, 
since the officers both testified that Appellant did not request a 
lawyer (Tr. 40). The trial court made no particular finding as to 
which subsection of the ordinance he found Appellant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In addition, the City did not argue for any 
particular finding of guilt under a specific section of the 
ordinance. i 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to 
convict Appellant of Obstruction of Justice. The conduct by the 
Appellant was not intended to be encompassed by the Obstruction of 
Justice Ordinance. The act of remaining silent when being asked to 
8 
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name an offender is not encompassed by the Obstruction of Justice 
ordinance. Consequently, the evidence presented at trial did not 
constitute a crime by the Appellant. 
In addition, trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the court's finding of guilt without stating which 
particular section of the ordinance Appellant was found to have 
violated. There are six different methods of obstructing justice 
under the ordinance, and no finding was made as to which of those 
Appellant violated. Moreover, the trial court committed plain error 
by failing to specify which section of the ordinance Appellant was 
found to be guilty of violating. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
APPELLANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT OF OBSTRUCTION OF 
JUSTICE 
The Salt Lake City Ordinance under which Appellant was 
charged offers six separate acts of conduct which can constitute 
Obstruction of Justice. The ordinance is set forth as follows: 
9 
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(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent 
to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the 
commission of a crime, he: 
(a) knowing an offense has been 
committed, conceals it from a magistrate; 
(b) harbors or conceals the offender; 
(c) provides the offender a weapon, 
transportation, disguise, or other means for 
avoiding discovery or apprehension; 
(d) warns the offender of impending -
discovery or apprehension; 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any 
physical evidence that might aid in the 
discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the 
person; or 
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or 
deception anyone from performing an act that 
might aid in the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, or conviction of the person. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060. 
The standard in sufficiency of evidence arguments is 
whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person 
could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. " State v. Morgan, 865 P. 2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . In the 
instant case, there was no evidence presented under any section of 
the ordinance which provided proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Appellant committed the crime charged. 
10 
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As stated above, there are six sections in the 
Obstruction of Justice ordinance under which a person can be 
convicted. The first section makes it an offense if a person, "with 
intent to hinder, prevent/ or delay the discovery/ apprehension, 
prosecution/ conviction/ or punishment of another for the 
commission of a crime/ knowing an offense has been committed, 
conceals it from a magistrate." Salt Lake City Ordinance § 
11.04.060 (1) (a) . Appellant submits that no evidence was presented 
which could support a finding that he concealed anything from a 
magistrate. Consequently, a finding of guilt fails as to subsection 
(a) of the ordinance. 
The second section makes it an offense if a person, "with 
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the 
commission of a crime, harbors or conceals the offender." Salt Lake 
City Ordinance § 11.04.060 (1) (b) . There was no evidence presented 
upon which a reasonable person could find that Appellant committed 
an offense under this section. Harboring or concealing involves an 
affirmative act of hiding, giving shelter or refuge to an offender. 
11 
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See People v. Sandoval, 791 P. 2d 1211 (Colo. 1990) (harboring where 
defendant hid fugitive under kitchen sink); State v. Mobley, 650 
P.2d 841 (N.M. 1982) (defendant convicted of aiding a felon by 
hiding felon in her house) . There was no evidence of any act by 
Appellant that could be viewed as hiding or giving refuge to an 
offender. Consequently, a finding of guilt fails as to subsection 
(b) of the ordinance. 
The third section makes it an offense if a person, "with 
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the 
commission of a crime, provides the offender a weapon, 
transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or 
apprehension," Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060 (1)(c). Again, 
there was no evidence presented at trial which would indicate 
Appellant provided the offender with a weapon, or disguise or any 
other affirmative means to avoid discovery or apprehension. There 
were no facts presented which would lead a reasonable person to 
believe Appellant violated this section of the ordinance beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This section requires providing the offender with 
12 
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some type of means of escape, and no evidence was offered in the 
trial court which would lead to such a conclusion.2 Consequently, 
a finding of guilt fails as to subsection (c) of the ordinance. 
The fourth section makes it an offense if a person, "with 
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the 
commission of a crime, warns the offender of impending discovery or 
apprehension." Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060 (1)(d). There 
was no evidence presented that Appellant ever warned the offender 
that he may be discovered or apprehended. Consequently, no 
reasonable person could find Appellant guilty of Obstruction of 
Justice beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus, a finding of guilt 
fails as to subsection (d) of the ordinance. 
The fifth section makes it an offense if a person, "with 
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the 
commission of a crime; conceals, destroys, or alters any physical 
2
 In this case, it obviously didn't take much police work to 
find the driver. He testified for the City that he was the 
driver. 
13 
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evidence that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, or 
conviction of the person." Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060 
(1)(e). Again, no evidence presented to the trial court gave any 
indication that Appellant concealed, destroyed, or altered any 
physical evidence which might have prevented the discovery of the 
offender. The only physical evidence in this case was the Porche. 
No evidence was presented that Appellant concealed, altered or 
destroyed the Porche. Quite to the contrary, the officers involved 
in this case discovered the vehicle involved in the hit and run 
prior to having any contact with Appellant. Therefore, these facts 
preclude a reasonable person from finding that Appellant was guilty 
of violating subsection (e) of the Ordinance, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. : 
The sixth section makes it an offense if a person, "with 
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the 
commission of a crime; obstructs by force, intimidation, or 
deception anyone from performing an act that might aid in the 
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of the person." 
14 
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Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060 (1)(f). The only supposition 
presented which could remotely fall under this section of the 
ordinance, was that Appellant refused to provide information as to 
the driver of the vehicle. There was no evidence presented that he 
used force, intimidation, or deception to prevent the discovery of 
the offender. Appellant merely refused to give any information and 
remained silent as to the identity of the offender. 
Appellant was a potential aider and abetter to a crime, 
and consequently, he had the right to remain silent. The Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person 
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself. . . ." U.S. Const., Amend V. The State's are bound, in a 
long line of cases, to the strictures of this provision through the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1 (1964); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). Similarly, 
the Utah Constitution provides that, "the accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself. . .." Utah Const. Art. 
1, Sec. 12. Moreover, the aider and abetter provision of the Utah 
Code states that "[e]very person, acting with the mental state 
15 
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required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1953, as amended). When 
approached by the officers in this case, Appellant, at least on the 
surface, faced the potential liability for a crime as an aider or 
abetter. As such, he is afforded the same rights as any other 
accused person in a criminal matter, including the right against 
self-incrimination. a 
Therefore, when Appellant refused to identify the driver, 
he was merely exercising his right against self-incrimination, and 
protecting himself from potential accomplice liability resulting 
from the hit-and-run accident. By not implicating the driver, 
Appellant was in effect protecting himself by refusing to admit he 
was at the scene and present during the accident. Those factors 
could easily place him in jeopardy of prosecution for the hit-and-
run accident as well. The officers at the time had no knowledge 
whether Appellant may have assisted, encouraged, or aided in the 
16 
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commission of the crime that took place, and consequently, had the 
potential of arresting Appellant for the same offense as the 
driver. Based upon those factors, Appellant had the right to remain 
silent and not to incriminate himself in any criminal conduct by 
providing information to the officers as to who was driving the 
vehicle, or by providing any information at all to the officers. 
This aspect of the case is comparable to Stephens v. 
State, 734 P. 2d 555 (Wyo. 1987) . In Stephens, the defendant was 
charged as an accomplice because he told the police he knew nothing 
about a burglary committed by his friend. The court reversed the 
conviction stating that there needed to be some affirmative act --
a mere denial of knowledge does not amount to a violation of the 
law. Id. The Wyoming court distinguished the facts of that case 
from one which would be considered a violation --if the defendant 
were to give false information. See also State v. Parker , 690 P. 2d 
1353 (Kan. 1984)(obstruction must substantially hinder or increase 
the burden on the officer in carrying out official duty -- held 
that silence does not substantially increase the burden); State v. 
17 
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Clifford, 502 P. 2d 1371 (Or. 1972) (held that one does not become an 
accessory merely by failing to disclose a known felon). 
It is equally true that one is not required to become an 
informant in the United States. Forced informing on friends is not 
a requirement of the law in civilized societies. It smacks of the 
type of compelled stoolism that has been soundly denounced in this 
country as a result of the McCarthy scare tactics during the Red 
Scare of the 1950's. In Utah, we have a long history and fear of 
compelled informing. As early as 1885, citizens of the Territory of 
Utah complained about being forced to snitch on neighbors, 
relatives and friends in the context of the anti-polygamy crusade 
of the federal territorial officials. In the "Declaration of 
Grievances and Protests, " the authors, John T. Caine and Heber 
Wells complained, in part: 
In Utah, Idaho and Arizona a concerted assault is 
made upon the "Mormon" people. 
"Spotters" and spies dog their footsteps. Delators 
thrust themselves into bedchambers and watch at windows. 
Children are questioned upon the streets as to the 
marital relations of their parents. Families are dragged 
before Commissioners and grand juries; and on pain of 
punishment for contempt, are compelled to testify against 
their fathers and husbands. Modest women are made to 
answer shamefully indecent questions as to the sexual 
18 
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relations of men and women. Attempts are made to bribe 
men to work up cases against their neighbors. Notoriously 
disreputable characters are employed to spy into men's 
family relations. 
Contrary to good law, person accused of crime are 
esteemed guilty until the prove themselves innocent. The 
burden of proof rests upon the accused instead of upon 
the accuser. 
Caine, John T., and Wells, Heber, "Declaration of Grievances and 
Protests to the President and the People of the United States," pg. 
6 (May 2, 1885). 
To require someone who is a potential accomplice or just 
a witness to talk to the police under threat of prosecution flies 
directly in the face of the history of this State and our vigilant 
objection to such police state conduct. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND APPELLANT GUILTY OF A 
SPECIFIC SECTION OF THE ORDINANCE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
To prevail [on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel] , a defendant must show, first, that his counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, 
which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant. 
19 
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Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 431 (1994) (quoting Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 
1988)) . 
Defense counsel failed to object to the trial court's 
finding of guilt absent a finding of which particular section of 
the ordinance he found Appellant guilty of committing beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Under the Strickland standard, counsel's 
performance was clearly deficient.3 See State v. Walters, 813 P. 2d 
857, 867 (Idaho 1990) . When an individual is convicted of a crime, 
it is the most fundamental of principles that he be found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific act or conduct. Appellant 
had no way of knowing which section of the law he was found to have 
violated, nor did the trial court express to Appellant that he was 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any particular section of 
3
 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984). The ABA Standards "furnish a reliable guide for determining 
the responsibilities of defense counsel...." Marzullo v. State of 
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 545 (4th Cir. 1977). The ABA Standard 
Relating to Defense Function provides that a lawyer should follow 
proper procedures, entering appropriate motions and objections to 
protect the rights of the accused. See ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice, "The Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (1979 & Supp., 1986) . 
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the Obstruction of Justice ordinance. Additionally, the prosecution 
failed to even articulate which section they believed Appellant was 
guilty of violating, and trial counsel failed to even address the 
ordinance or its elements in argument. 
Trial counsel's performance was deficient by failing to 
object to the inadequate finding by the trial court, and 
consequently, Appellant suffered prejudice as a result of the trial 
court's finding. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO MAKE 
AN ADEQUATE FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF A 
SPECIFIC SECTION OF THE ORDINANCE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
As noted above, the ordinance under which Appellant was 
convicted offers six separate acts of conduct which can constitute 
Obstruction of Justice. The ordinance is again set forth as 
follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent 
to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the 
commission of a crime, he: 
(a) knowing an offense has been 
committed, conceals it from a magistrate; 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(b) harbors or conceals the offender; 
(c) provides the offender a weapon, 
transportation, disguise, or other means for 
avoiding discovery or apprehension; 
(d) warns the offender of impending 
discovery or apprehension; 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any 
physical evidence that might aid in the 
discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the 
person; or 
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or 
deception anyone from performing an act that 
might aid in the discovery, apprehension, T 
prosecution, or conviction of the person. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060. The above subsections outline 
different modes of conduct which can each be a violation of the 
Obstruction of Justice ordinance. Appellant submits that the issue 
argued before the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 
162 (Utah 1987), applies to the instant case. In that case, the 
defendant argued that the jury must unanimously agree as to which 
of the three theories of mens rea defendant employed to convict him 
of second degree murder. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed as it 
related to the mens rea of a second-degree murder offense. However, 
the court, in dicta, stated, "if the statute under which the 
defendant is convicted actually defines more than one crime which 
may be committed in several different ways, the defendant is 
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entitled to jury unanimity on which crime he is guilty of 
committing." Id. at 166-67. The Utah Supreme Court relied on the 
Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th 
Cir. 1977), in reaching such a conclusion. 
The Gipson case involved a defendant charged with 
violation a statute which prohibited six enumerated acts. The jury 
instruction given permitted conviction without requiring the jury 
to be unanimous on which act the defendant had committed and in 
which incident. The Fifth Circuit court reversed Gipson's 
conviction, holding that the defendant was entitled to unanimity on 
which actus reus element of the offense subjected the defendant to 
guilt in a particular incident. Id. at 457-58. More importantly, as 
it relates to the instant case, the Gipson court held that the jury 
should have been required to agree upon "just what the defendant 
did." Id. Although Gipson involved a jury, Appellant submits that 
the same principle applies in his case. The trial court is required 
to determine just what act Appellant committed which violated the 
Obstruction of Justice ordinance. The ordinance under which 
Appellant was charged has six enumerated sections which can 
constitute a violation of the law. This ordinance is not the kind 
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of statute with various distinctions as to mens rea, like the 
murder statute dealt with by the Russell court. It is, however, 
akin to the situation presented in Gipson, and approved, in dicta, 
by the Russell court. The various provisions of the ordinance 
actually present distinct conduct which violates the ordinance. 
The trial judge did not make any finding of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt under any specific section. The trial judge 
merely found Appellant "guilty of the crime charged." Appellant 
argues that such a finding of guilt is directly contrary to the 
holding in Gipson as well as dicta presented in the Russell case 
out of the Utah Supreme Court. Every defendant who is convicted of 
a crime is entitled to know what act or conduct was deemed in 
violation of law. That was completely lacking from the trier of 
fact in this case. 
In addition, the trial court's indication that the Fifth 
Amendment does not apply in this case is error, based upon 
Appellant's argument in Point I, above. Consequently, Appellant's 
conviction should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court reverse his conviction. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above 
matter due to the important constitutional questions and rulings 
involved. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of September, 1998. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
By 
VANESSA M. RAMOS-SMITH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage 
prepaid, this day of September, 1998, to: 
Augustus G. Chin 
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 East 
Room 125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE § 11.04.060 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with 
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of 
another for the commission of a crime, he: 
(a) knowing an offense has been 
committed, conceals it from a magistrate; 
(b) harbors or conceals the offender; 
(c ) provides the offender a weapon, 
transportation, disguise, or other means for 
avoiding discovery or apprehension; 
(d) warns the offender of impending 
discovery or apprehension; 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any 
physical evidence that might aid in the 
discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the 
person; or 
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or 
deception anyone from performing an act that 
might aid in the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, or conviction of the person. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060. 
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76-2-104 CRIMINAL CODE 262 
the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree tha t the failure to perceive it consti-
tutes a gross deviation from the standard of care tha t an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 1974 
76-2-104. Culpable mental s tate — Higher mental 
s tates included. 
(1) If acting with criminal negligence is sufficient to estab-
lish the culpable mental state for an element of an offense, 
that element is also established if a person acts intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly. 
(2) If acting recklessly is sufficient to establish the culpable 
mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also 
established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. 
(3) If acting knowingly is sufficient to establish the culpable 
mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also 
established if a person acts intentionally. 1998 
F A R T 2 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF 
ANOTHER 
76-2-201. Definit ions. , , . . 
. As used in this part: , » 
(1) "Agent" means any director, officer, employee, or 
other person authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or 
association. < * . ' *; 
(2) "High managerial agent" means: 
(a) A partner in a partnership; 
(b) An officer of a corporation or association; 
(c) An agent of a corporation or association who 
,}[ has duties of such responsibility that his conduct 
reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of 
the corporation or association. 
(3) "Corporation" means all organizations required by 
the laws of this state or any other state to obtain a 
certificate of authority, a certificate of incorporation, or 
other form of registration to transact business as a 
corporation within this state or any other state and shall 
include domestic, foreign, profit and nonprofit corpora-
tions, but shall not include a corporation sole, as such 
term is used in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. Lack of* an appropriate certificate of authority, 
incorporation, or other form of registration shall be no 
defense when such organization conducted its business in 
a manner as to appear to have lawful corporate existence. 
1973 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commis-
sion of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
> • • : ' ' • • • : } .!• *•'. 1 9 7 3 
76-2-203. Defenses unavailable in prosecution based 
on conduct of another. 
In any prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibil-
ity is based on the conduct of another, it is no defense: 
(1) That the actor belongs to a class of persons who by 
definition of the offense is legally incapable of committing 
the offense in an individual capacity^ or . . 
(2) That the person for whose conduct the actor is 
. criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been 
prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different 
offense or of a different type,or class of offense or is 
:
 f i m m u n e f r o m p r o s e c u t i o n . ..-•,• / • 1973 
76-2-204. Criminal responsibility of corporation or as-
sociation. 
A,corporation or association is guilty of an offense when: 
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an 
omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative perfor-
• mance imposed on corporations or associations by law; or 
; (2) The conduct constituting the offense is authorized, 
solicited, requested, commanded, or undertaken, per-
formed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or 
•
 : , by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his 
employment and in behalf of the corporation or associa-
tion. ' 1973 
76-2-205. Criminal responsibility of person for con-
duct in name of corporation or association. 
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an 
offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the 
name of or on behalf of a corporation or association to the same 
extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or 
b e h a l f ; < • ; . . - . . . ' , • • r . 1 9 7 3 
PART 3 
DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
76-2-301., Person under fourteen years old not crimi-
nally responsible. 
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed 
before he reaches the age of fourteen years. This section shall 
in,no way limit the jurisdiction of or proceedings before the 
juvenile courts of this state. 1973 
76-2-302. Compulsion. ' ' 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in 
the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the 
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force 
upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a 
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not have 
resisted. , ^ ;. . -
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall 
be unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable 
that he will be subjected to duress. 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the 
presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or 
to any defense of compulsion except as in Subsection (1) 
provided. 1973 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into com-
mitting the offense. Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or 
a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer 
induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creat-
ing a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by 
one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely afford-
ing a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not 
constitute entrapment. < 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable, when 
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the 
offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct 
causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment. .r w 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even 
though the actor denies commission of the conduct charged to 
constitute the offense. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A m e n d . I U N I T E D STATUS 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to.be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI V 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. -
AMENDMENT VH l;;: 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
UU1NST1/JLUJ.11WI 
i 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fine 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT EX ,...-;. j 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shs 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by tl 
people. 
AMENDMENT* 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by tl 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, aire reserved 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENTS " 
[Suits against states - - Restriction of judicial power 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be c( 
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign Sta 
AMENDMENTXII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and v 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state yt 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the; person vo 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted foi 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all j 
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which 1 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the sea 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Pr 
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—' 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presid< 
shall be the President,- if such number be a majority of 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person h 
such majority, then from the persons having the higl 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted fo: 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose imm 
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Presid 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation f 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose s 
consist of a member or members from two-thirdls of the sta 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a ch< 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choos 
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve v 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case*of 
death or other constitutional disability of the President-
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-Presid 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority oi 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person ha 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole numb< 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shal 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally inelij 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of ^ 
President of the United States. 
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Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 660 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. :* 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or a t any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. ! 4 " ' 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ru th may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury tha t the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall a t any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1696 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without jus t compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. *
 l g96 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] ',: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
; 1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people. .,_.'. 1896 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 1896 
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